American casuakties should be only one factor in the Iraq equation
The U. S. death toll in Iraq is roughly 4,000 after more than four years of fighting.. Overall casualties reach several times that. Success or failure of government policy can almost never be reduced to simple numbers, but opponents of the Iraq War have consistently emphasized the human cost. It’s a compelling, emotional argument against a war many Americans no longer support. What stressing the numbers probably doesn’t do, however, is lead to sound policy.
When President Bush made the decision to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein by invading Iraq, the U. S. Secretary of State was Colin Powell. Powell was a hugely respected figure in America and around the world, and the author of the Powell Doctrine, which basically states that when the U. S. decides using military force as a policy tool is necessary, the force applied should be overwhelming, and the exit strategy should be clearly defined. .General Powell is a veteran of Vietnam, and his emphasis on strict strategic control no doubt springs from the American experience in Powell’s first war.
The problem would seem to be that the Powell Doctrine can only reasonably be applied to certain wars. No one knew what the outcome of World War II would be in 1942, for example; the exit strategies of all the powers involved, beyond winning, were fluid. Nor could the Allies apply overwhelming force in that war until well into 1944. The Powell Doctrine applies largely to asymmetrical wars, conflicts like Grenada, or Desert Storm, in which one side had no hope of successfully resisting the other.
Assuming the above analysis is correct, the argument could be made that the Powell Doctrine would not have applied to Vietnam. The North Vietnamese were a capable, determined, sophisticated foe backed at different times throughout the long war by China, the Soviet Union, or early on, by both. The U. S. could not have applied overwhelming force without risking a wider conflict, and it was never in a position to dictate an exit strategy.
Should the Powell Doctrine have been followed in the 2003 invasion of Iraq? While the military outcome might never have been in doubt, assuming Coalition leaders held their nerve and Saddam didn’t employ unconventional tactics, the Iraqi Army seemed to be a large, capable force. Breaking that force seemed destined to be a bloody task. That’s not the way things turned out.
The actual invasion cost relatively few Coalition lives, and was accomplished by a force that depended as much on speed and maneuverability as on power. The problem—and nearly all the casualties—has come in trying to hold the country and establish some order. That’s when Powell’s “overwhelming force” may have been useful. Battling guerillas and organized insurgencies, however, often takes many years, as the British have found in various places around the world, That way lies no clear, clean, early exit strategy.
A larger force after the successful invasion could have maintained order and discouraged an insurgency from forming. A larger force could also have bolstered suspicions throughout the Arab world that America and Britain were interested in Iraqi oil not Iraqi liberation. In that case, Arab strategists could have pursued opposition indirectly, with unpredictable consequences.
The situation in Iraq is what it is. Dealing with it requires taking many factors into account and making the best possible judgment. American casualties constitute one factor, but they should not be the governing one.
